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I. INTRODUCTION 
By the end of this century climate change will cause a global rise 
in sea level that is unprecedented in American history.  Thousands of 
square miles of land, and several major cities, are at risk of becoming 
submerged under ocean waters.1  This large-scale sea level rise will 
cause a collision between two fundamental doctrines of property 
law—the public trust doctrine and the takings clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.  The public trust doctrine will require the states to 
assert control over vast amounts of private lands that are submerged 
by the ocean and have become tidal lands and waters subject to the 
public trust.  Yet, if this act is considered a taking it may impose a 
significant financial burden on the states to provide adequate 
compensation, and perhaps even be impracticable given the 
substantial amounts of land and large number of private property 
owners threatened by large-scale sea level rise. 
This large-scale sea level rise caused by climate change will 
present a new and unique challenge to current takings jurisprudence.  
For the past century, many of the most difficult and contentious issues 
arising out of the takings clause involved determining whether a 
government regulation of private property constituted a taking.2  
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 1. Jeremy Weiss & Jonathan Overpeck, University of Arizona Department of 
Geosciences Environmental Studies Laboratory, Climate Change and Sea Level (2006), 
http://www.geo.arizona.edu/dgesl/research/other/climate_change_and_sea_level/sea_level_rise/s
ea_level_rise.htm; see also Rising Seas Will Reshape the U.S., L.A. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2007, at A16. 
 2. The Supreme Court first held that a government regulation could violate the takings 
clause in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).  In a series of cases over the 
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Traditionally, the state action implicated by climate change and large-
scale sea level rise—where the government either takes title to 
private land or subjects it to the public trust—has been considered an 
undisputed taking that requires compensation.3  While this per se 
takings rule is one of the most stable and uncontroversial aspects of 
current takings jurisprudence,4 the unprecedented nature of large-
scale sea level rise caused by climate change requires a reexamination 
of whether it should always be a taking any time the government 
appropriates or occupies private land. 
This Note examines how climate change and the resulting sea 
level rise will place new tensions on the interaction of the public trust 
doctrine and the takings clause.  It argues that it should not be 
considered a taking when a state takes title or asserts control over 
private lands submerged due to climate change and large-scale sea 
level rise, even if the government takes the entire property interest of 
a private property owner.  Part II explains the basics of climate 
change and sea level rise.  Part III explores the public trust doctrine 
as it applies to coastal lands and waters, the common law doctrine of 
erosion and accretion, and the takings clause.  Part IV considers the 
tension that climate change will create between the public trust 
doctrine and the takings clause.  Finally, Part V reexamines the 
takings clause in light of our climate changed future and argues for a 
narrow exception to the per se possessory takings rule. 
past thirty years, the Court has continually refined its regulatory takings jurisprudence.  See, e.g., 
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1032 (1992) (holding that a regulation which 
deprives a property owner of all economically beneficial use of the land is a categorical taking 
unless it regulates a common law nuisance); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 
104, 124 (1978) (noting factors the Court will consider when determining whether a regulation is 
a taking). 
 3. See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) (“The paradigmatic 
taking requiring just compensation is a direct government appropriation or physical invasion of 
private property.”); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 607 (2001) (“The clearest sort of 
taking occurs when the government encroaches upon or occupies private land for its own 
proposed use.”). 
 4. While the determination whether an action is a taking may be uncontroversial, other 
aspects of the takings analysis for possessory takings can produce substantial controversy.  One 
recent example is the public outcry following the Supreme Court’s holding in Kelo v. City of 
New London, 545 U.S. 469, 490 (2005), that economic and commercial development is a valid 
“public use” for which the government may condemn private property.  See Leonard C. Gilroy, 
KELO: ONE YEAR LATER (2006), http://www.reason.org/commentaries/gilroy_20060621.shtml. 
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II.  CLIMATE CHANGE AND SEA LEVEL RISE 
A. The Basics of Climate Change 
The concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere has 
increased significantly since the 18th century and the dawning of the 
industrial revolution.5  The four principal greenhouse gases emitted 
by anthropogenic activities are carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous 
oxide and halocarbons.6  The atmospheric concentration of carbon 
dioxide has increased from a pre-industrial value of 280 ppm (parts 
per million) to 379 ppm in 2005, primarily because of the burning of 
fossil fuels and changes in land use.7  The atmospheric concentrations 
of methane and nitrous oxide have similarly increased, mainly due to 
increased agriculture.8  The current atmospheric concentrations of 
these greenhouse gases now “far exceed” the atmospheric 
concentration levels measured in ice cores spanning thousands of 
years.9 
This increase in the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse 
gases alters the energy balance of the climate system by trapping heat 
near the Earth’s surface.10  As a result, there has been an 
“unequivocal” warming of the Earth.11  The average global surface 
temperature today is 0.76°C warmer than it was in 1850-1899, and 
eleven of the last twelve years have been the warmest on record since 
1850.12  This warming trend is gaining speed, as “[t]he linear warming 
 5. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Summary for Policymakers, in 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS.  CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING 
GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2 (S. Solomon et al. eds., 2007) (hereinafter SUMMARY FOR 
POLICYMAKERS). 
 6. Piers Forster et al., Changes in Atmospheric Constituents and in Radiative Forcing, in 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 5, at 135. 
 7. SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, supra note 5, at 2. 
 8. Id. at 3.  The atmospheric concentration of methane has increased from a pre-industrial 
value of 715 ppb (parts per billion) to 1774 ppb in 2005.  The atmospheric concentration of 
nitrous oxide has increased from 270 ppb to 319 ppb during this same time period.  Id. 
 9. Id. at 2.  In the ten thousand years before 1750, atmospheric concentrations of carbon 
dioxide stayed within the range of 280 ppm ± 20 ppm.  Herve Le Treut et al., Historical 
Overview of Climate Change Science, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE 
BASIS, supra note 5, at 100. 
 10. Le Treut et al., supra note 9, at 115-16. 
 11. SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, supra note 5, at 5. 
 12. Id. 
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trend for the last 50 years . . . is nearly twice that for the last 100 
years.”13 
If humans were to eliminate all future greenhouse gas emissions 
there would still be warming in this century and beyond due to the 
length of time that greenhouse gases remain in the atmosphere.14  
Under an extremely optimistic scenario in which the concentration of 
greenhouse gases is kept constant at year 2000 levels, there would still 
be an additional 0.6°C rise in temperature by the end of this century.15  
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) predicts 
a temperature increase of between 1.8°C and 4.0°C by the end of this 
century, based on modeling of six likely scenarios for future 
greenhouse gas emissions.16 
B. Sea Level Rise 
An increase in the average global surface temperature causes sea 
level to rise through two processes—thermal expansion and the 
melting of land-based ice.17  First, thermal expansion occurs as the 
temperature of the ocean rises, because water expands as it warms.18  
Second, when land-based ice in glaciers and ice sheets melts, 
additional water is transferred to the ocean and sea level rises.19  To 
illustrate the large quantities of water stored in land-based ice, a 
complete melting of the Greenland Ice Sheet would raise sea level by 
approximately seven meters (22.97 feet), while a complete melting of 
the West Antarctic Ice Sheet would cause a sea level rise of five to six 
meters (16.4 to 19.7 feet).20 
The current 0.76°C increase in temperature from the late 19th 
century has already caused oceans to warm and sea level to rise.  The 
average global ocean temperature has risen by 0.10°C from 1961 to 
 13. Id. 
 14. Gerald A. Meehl et al., Global Climate Projections, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE 
PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 5, at 824-25.  Approximately twenty percent of emitted 
carbon dioxide will remain in the atmosphere for many millennia, while more than half will 
remain in the atmosphere for less than 100 years.  The lifetime of a molecule of methane in the 
atmosphere is about twelve years, while the lifetime for nitrous oxide is about 110 years.  Id. at 
824. 
 15. SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, supra note 5, at 13. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Nathaniel L. Bindoff et al., Observations: Oceanic Climate Change and Sea Level, in 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 5, at 408. 
 18. Id. at 409. 
 19. Id. at 408. 
 20. Meehl et al., supra note 14, at 819. 
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2003.21  After thousands of years of stability, sea level gradually rose 
during the 20th century and is now rising at an increased rate.22  Since 
1993, the rate of annual sea level rise has been 3 mm per year.23  
Thermal expansion and land-based ice melting have each accounted 
for approximately half of this recent rise in sea level.24 
In this century, the rate of sea level rise will increase.25  The 
Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC estimates that by 2100 sea 
level will rise by 0.6 meters (1.97 feet) or more, and that sea surface 
temperatures will rise by up to 3°C.26  However, there is a possibility 
that sea level rise could be substantially larger than these estimates 
because the IPCC’s projection for this century is based on a minimal 
contribution to sea level rise from melting of the Greenland Ice 
Sheet.27  The IPCC acknowledges that there is some evidence that 
points to a quicker collapse of the Greenland and West Antarctic Ice 
Sheets than their sea level rise projections assume.28  Indeed, recent 
research shows that the Greenland Ice Sheet is melting more rapidly 
than scientists expected.29  In addition, while the IPCC sea level rise 
projection assumes that the West Antarctic Ice Sheet’s net 
contribution to sea level rise in the coming centuries will be 
 21. Bindoff et al., supra note 17, at 387. 
 22. Id. at 409. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Robert J. Nicholls et al., Coastal Systems and Low-Lying Areas, in CLIMATE CHANGE 
2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY.  CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II 
TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE 317 (2007). 
 27. Meehl et al., supra note 14, at 752 (“The Greenland Ice Sheet is projected to contribute 
to sea level after 2100 . . . .  The contribution would be greater if dynamical processes omitted 
from the current models increased the rate of ice flow, as has been observed in recent years.”). 
 28. See id. at 821 (“Further accelerations in ice flow of the kind recently observed in some 
Greenland outlet glaciers and West Antarctic ice streams could increase the ice sheet 
contributions substantially . . . .”); id. at 819 (“Recent satellite and in situ observations of ice 
streams behind disintegrating ice shelves highlight some rapid reactions of ice sheet systems.  
This raises new concern about the overall stability of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet . . . .”). 
 29. See, e.g., Eric Rignot & Pannir Kanagaratnam, Changes in Velocity Structure of the 
Greenland Ice Sheet, 311 SCIENCE 986, 988 (2006) (“Greenland’s mass loss therefore doubled in 
the last decade, well beyond error bounds.  Its contribution to sea-level rise increased from 0.23 
± 0.08 mm/year in 1996 to 0.57 ± 0.1 mm/year in 2005.”); Richard A. Kerr, A Worrying Trend of 
Less Ice, Higher Seas, 311 SCIENCE 1698, 1698 (2006) (noting recent studies showing the 
Greenland and Antarctic Ice Sheets melting quicker than predicted and stating that “[s]ome of 
the glaciers draining the great ice sheets of Antarctica and Greenland have sped up 
dramatically, driving up sea level and catching scientists unawares”). 
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negative,30 current research shows that the ice sheet has been losing 
mass since 2002 at a rate that already contributes 0.4 mm per year to 
sea level rise.31 
C. Sea Level Rise in the United States 
A rise in sea level caused by climate change threatens to 
inundate substantial amounts of coastal property in the United States 
in the coming century and beyond.  A one meter (3.28 feet) rise in sea 
level would submerge approximately 25,000 square miles of 
American soil in the lower 48 states.32  The Eastern and Gulf coasts 
will be the hardest hit, with Louisiana, Texas, Florida, North 
Carolina, and South Carolina projected to lose the most land.33  Over 
20% of the United States’ remaining coastal wetlands could be 
inundated by the end of this century.34  With a one meter rise in sea 
level, most of Miami, virtually all of New Orleans, and parts of 
Boston would be underwater.35 
Population, property values, and investment along the coasts 
continue to grow rapidly in spite of the threat posed by rising seas.36  
While affluent nations such as the United States will very likely 
attempt to mitigate the impacts of sea level rise using techniques such 
as bulkheads or beach nourishment projects, these mitigation 
measures will be costly and limited by the vast scope of coastline 
threatened by large-scale sea level rise.37  For example, protecting the 
 30. Meehl et al., supra note 14, at 752. 
 31. Isabella Velicogna & John Wahr, Measurements of Time-Variable Gravity Show Mass 
Loss in Antarctica, 311 SCIENCE 1754, 1755 (2006). 
 32. Rising Seas Will Reshape the U.S., L.A. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2007, at A16.  This number 
does not account for the loss of land in Hawaii and Alaska.  Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Christopher B. Field et al., North America, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, 
ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 26, at 630. 
 35. Weiss & Overpeck, supra note 1. 
 36. See Field et al., supra note 34, at 630 (stating that an additional 25 million people will 
live in coastal regions over the next 25 years); Matt Woolsey, Most Expensive ZIP Codes in the 
U.S., FORBES, Sept. 13, 2007, http://www.forbes.com/realestate/2007/09/12/zip-expensive-list-
forbeslife-cx_07zip_mw_0913realestate.html (noting that the list of zip codes with the highest 
property values in the Unites States is “heavy with ZIPs along the coasts” and “dominated by 
ZIPs in the nation’s coastal states” because of the lack of land to develop along the coasts). 
 37. The United States has 95,439 miles of shoreline.  National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, http://www.noaa.gov/coasts.html (last visited January 29, 2008).  Some have 
claimed that large-scale sea level rise caused by climate change does not represent a significant 
threat to the United States because we will be able to protect vulnerable and valuable coastal 
areas from this rise in sea level.  E.g., BJORN LOMBORG, COOL IT: THE SKEPTICAL 
ENVIRONMENTALIST’S GUIDE TO GLOBAL WARMING 61 (2007) (“[W]ith sea-level changes 
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beaches in Florida from a 0.5 meter (1.64 feet) rise in sea level using 
sand replenishment has an estimated cost range of $1.7 to $8.8 
billion.38 
In summary, climate change will cause a rise in sea level in the 
future that is unprecedented in American history.  The current IPCC 
estimate projects a 0.6 meter (1.97 feet) rise in global sea level by 
2100.39  At one meter of sea level rise (3.28 feet), over 25,000 square 
miles of land would disappear and several major cities would be 
mostly underwater.40  However, there is a possibility that we could 
experience a much greater rise in sea level because the Greenland 
and Antarctic Ice Sheets appear to be melting at rates not accounted 
for in our current sea level rise projections.41  Even if aggressive 
measures are taken to cut future greenhouse gas emissions there will 
still be a substantial future rise in sea level.42  Despite the inherent 
uncertainties in projecting sea level rise far into the future, we can be 
certain that an increasing amount of private coastal land and property 
will become inundated and submerged by the ocean due to the effects 
of climate change. 
III.  PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PROPERTY INTERESTS IN COASTAL 
LANDS AND THE TAKINGS CLAUSE 
A. The Public Trust Doctrine 
The states possess title to most tidal lands and waters below the 
mean high-tide line through the public trust doctrine.  The public 
trust doctrine, which dates back to early English common law and 
Roman law, provides that the state holds title to coastal lands and 
occurring slowly throughout the century, economically rational foresight will make sure that 
protection will be afforded to property that is worth more than the protection costs.”).  
Notwithstanding the costs and quantities of coastline that would have to be protected, such 
extensive artificial protections may be undesirable as they would have devastating ecological 
consequences and would result in the loss of beaches.  See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, The Story of 
Lucas: Environmental Land Use Regulation Between Developers and the Deep Blue Sea, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 237, 261-62 (Richard J. Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck eds., 2005) 
(discussing how erosion control devices and beach armoring accelerate and add to the overall 
loss of beaches, sand, and dunes). 
 38. Field et al., supra note 34, at 634. 
 39. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 40. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text. 
 41. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text. 
 42. See Nicholls et al., supra note 26, at 317 (“Sea-level rise has substantial inertia and will 
continue beyond 2100 for many centuries.”). 
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waters below the mean high-tide line in trust for the public.43  The 
public trust doctrine initially developed to ensure unimpeded public 
rights of navigation, commerce, and fishing in the tidal lands and 
waters.44  In addition to these traditional public rights, courts have 
expanded the public trust doctrine to include other public rights in 
the coasts such as swimming, recreation, and conservation.45  Any 
private use or right in these tidal lands and waters is necessarily 
subordinate to the public rights.46  While there has been active 
scholarly debate on the extent and nature of the public trust 
doctrine,47 since the 19th century the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
upheld the validity of the public trust doctrine as applied to state 
control over tidal lands and waters.48 
After the American Revolution, the original thirteen states took 
title to tidal lands as inheritors of the English Crown; and later states 
admitted into the Union were vested with these same rights in tidal 
waters through the equal footing doctrine.49  Each individual State 
then has the “authority to define the limits of the lands held in public 
trust and to recognize private rights in such lands as they see fit.”50  
As a result, the extent of public ownership of tidal lands varies among 
 43. JOSEPH J. KALO ET AL., COASTAL AND OCEAN LAW 2-3 (3d ed. 2007). 
 44. See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892) (“It is a title held in trust 
for the people of the State that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce 
over them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed from the obstruction or interference of 
private parties.”). 
 45. KALO ET AL., supra note 43, at 45. 
 46. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894) (“[The] improvement [of tidal public trust 
lands and waters] by individuals, when permitted, is incidental or subordinate to the public use 
and right.”). 
 47. Compare Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective 
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 556-57 (1970) (arguing that the public trust doctrine 
is broader than the historical scope of public trust law), with James L. Huffman, Speaking of 
Inconvenient Truths: A History of the Public Trust Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1 
(2007) (criticizing contemporary efforts to expand the public trust doctrine as distorting and 
misrepresenting the historical foundations of the doctrine). 
 48. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 476-77 (1988) (“Petitioners 
do not deny that broad statements of public trust dominion over tidelands have been included in 
this Court’s opinions since the early 19th century.”); Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 435 (“It is 
the settled law of this country that the ownership . . . over lands covered by tide waters . . . 
belong to the respective States . . . .”). 
 49. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 473-74 (“Upon the American Revolution, these 
[public trust] rights . . . were vested in the original States . . . .  The new States admitted into the 
Union . . . have the same rights as the original States in the tide waters, and in the lands under 
them . . . .”); Robert L. Fischman, Global Warming and Property Interests: Preserving Coastal 
Wetlands as Sea Levels Rise, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 565, 577 (1991) (“The ‘equal footing’ doctrine 
gives all other states the same rights as the original thirteen.”). 
 50. Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 475. 
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the states.  For example, most states have kept the traditional mean 
high-tide line as the boundary between public and private property.51  
However, there is public ownership of the dry sand above the mean 
high-tide line in some states, while other states only hold title to the 
land below the mean low-tide line.52  There is a limit to a state’s 
authority to redefine or dispose of its public trust lands.  A state 
cannot divest itself of its public trust responsibilities, and the interests 
of the public must be served.53 
B. The Common Law Doctrine of Erosion and Accretion 
Coasts are dynamic ecosystems that present a unique problem 
for property law because any property boundary based on the mean 
tide line will fluctuate and vary over time.  The common law doctrine 
of erosion and accretion developed for situations when erosion causes 
the shoreline to move inland, or when accretion causes the shoreline 
to move toward the sea.54  The general rule is that the public/private 
property line will shift with the mean tide line.55  When there is 
erosion of the coast the public/private property line moves inland and 
a littoral owner will lose land.56  Conversely, when accretion occurs 
the public/private property line will move toward the sea, and a 
littoral owner acquires title to the accretions.57 
There are qualifications to the general rule that property lines 
move with the mean tide line.  The doctrine of erosion and accretion 
only applies to gradual and imperceptible changes.  Sudden alteration 
of the shoreline through avulsion will not change the property line.58  
In addition, any change to the shoreline that is not natural may 
modify this general rule.  A majority of states allow the littoral owner 
to take title to unnatural accretions, so long as they are caused by a 
third party without the influence or consent of the littoral owner who 
 51. E.g., James G. Titus, Rising Seas, Coastal Erosion, and the Takings Clause: How to Save 
Wetlands and Beaches Without Hurting Property Owners, 57 MD. L. REV. 1279, 1292-93 (1998). 
 52. Id. at 1293. 
 53. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 453. 
 54. See, e.g., Ford v. Turner, 142 So. 2d 335, 342 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (stating that due 
to the dynamic nature of shorelines “[p]ublic policy demands a definite standard of quieting title 
to these areas despite the fact that occasionally some hardship may occur”). 
 55. KALO ET AL., supra note 43, at 50. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
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will gain title to the accretions.59  In other states, the state takes title 
to any artificially-created accretions.
C. The Takings Clause 
The takings clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that 
“private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”61  The takings clause places a condition upon the 
government interfering with private property rights, by requiring 
compensation if that interference amounts to a taking.62  The 
Supreme Court has stated that one purpose of the takings clause is to 
prevent the government from “forcing some people alone to bear 
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by 
the public as a whole.”63  The “paradigmatic” taking occurs with 
possessory takings when the government directly appropriates or 
physically invades private property.64  In addition, government 
regulation of private property may constitute a taking if it “goes too 
far,” so that the effect of the regulation is equivalent to that of a 
“direct appropriation or ouster.”65 
The question of whether a taking has occurred has been 
straightforward in the possessory takings context, when the 
government directly appropriates or physically invades private 
property for a public use.  In these cases, the government’s action is 
undisputedly a taking and the contested issue is typically whether the 
taking was for a “public use”66 or what “just compensation” is due to 
the private property owner.67 
The Supreme Court has developed an extensive takings 
jurisprudence that guides the inquiry into whether a government 
regulation will be deemed a taking.  One fundamental principle is that 
 59. Titus, supra note 51, at 1368-69. 
 60. Id. at 1369. 
 61. U.S. CONST. amend. V.  While the Fifth Amendment only directly applies to the federal 
government, the takings clause is applied to the states through its incorporation into the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R.R. v. 
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897). 
 62. See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536-37 (2005). 
 63. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
 64. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537. 
 65. Id. (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)). 
 66. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); discussed supra note 4. 
 67. In general, the fair market value of the property taken is considered just compensation.  
However, this is a deceptively simple summary and “the law of just compensation is busy and 
complex.”  JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 958 (6th ed. 2006). 
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a regulation that controls a nuisance is never a taking, as the 
government should not have to pay to regulate behavior or land use 
that is harmful to the public health and safety.68  In addition, there are 
two other categories of government regulation that are considered to 
be per se takings.  First, any permanent physical occupation is 
considered a per se taking, regardless of the degree of the physical 
occupation or the existence of an important public purpose that is 
served by the physical occupation.69  Second, a regulation that 
deprives a property owner of all economically beneficial use of the 
property is also considered a per se taking.70  If the regulation does 
not prevent a nuisance and does not fall within either of the narrow 
per se takings categories then a court will conduct a balancing test 
that considers factors such as the character of the government action, 
the economic impact of the regulation on the property owner, and the 
property owner’s investment-backed expectations.71 
IV.  THE IMPENDING COLLISION OF THE  
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND THE TAKINGS CLAUSE 
As sea level rises in the coming century and beyond an 
unprecedented amount of private property will become submerged 
beneath the ocean waters.  On one hand, the public trust doctrine 
seemingly mandates that the states take title or assert the public trust 
over these private lands as they become tidal lands and waters.  On 
the other, the takings clause seemingly requires the state to provide 
compensation if it takes these properties.  When one considers the 
possibility that tens of thousands of square miles of land containing 
valuable coastal properties and entire cities such as Miami and New 
Orleans could become submerged, it seems impracticable for the 
states to protect and extend the public trust if they are required to 
 68. See generally Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (holding that a city 
ordinance prohibiting the operation of brickyards was not a taking of an existing brickyard 
owner’s property because the operation of brickyards was a nuisance that endangered the public 
health and safety). 
 69. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) (holding 
that a state law allowing cable companies to install permanent cable facilities on apartment 
buildings was a taking, and noting that a permanent physical invasion of property is “perhaps 
the most serious form of invasion of an owner’s property interests”). 
 70. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1026-32 (1992) (holding that any 
regulation that deprives a property owner of all economically beneficial uses of the property is a 
per se taking, except to the extent that “background principles of nuisance and property law” 
independently restrict the use of the property). 
 71. See generally Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
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provide full compensation to all private property owners.  Thus, it 
appears that one effect of climate change will be a collision between 
two fundamental doctrines of American property law—the public 
trust doctrine and the takings clause. 
A. States Must Assert the Public Trust 
The public trust doctrine regarding state control over coastal 
lands and waters has been a relatively stable legal doctrine that dates 
back to Roman times.72  The continuing durability of the public trust 
doctrine across varied nations and legal regimes implies that public 
control over coastal lands and waters better serves society’s interest 
than granting full private property interests in these lands and waters.  
Climate change will not alter this, and the societal interest in public 
control of tidal lands and waters will be as applicable in our climate 
changed future as it has been since Roman times.  As a result, one 
could expect states to protect the public’s interest in commerce, 
navigation, fishing, recreation, and other resources by asserting the 
public trust over private lands that have become inundated due to 
climate change. 
In addition to a state’s interest in controlling coastal lands and 
waters, the public trust doctrine likely requires a state to take title or 
assert control on behalf of the public over submerged private lands.  
In the seminal public trust case of Illinois Central Railroad, the 
Supreme Court held that a state could not divest itself of its pubic 
trust responsibilities, and that any transfer of public trust lands to a 
private party was void if it violated the public’s interest.73  The Court 
stated that: 
[t]he trust devolving upon the State for the public . . . cannot be 
relinquished by a transfer of the property.  The control of the State 
for the purposes of the trust can never be lost. . . .  The State can no 
more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are 
 72. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text. 
 73. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453-54 (1892).  Illinois Central Railroad has 
been criticized as “badly misunderstood and its holding distorted” for its use as a foundation for 
an expansive public trust doctrine.  Huffman, supra note 47.  In addition, the scope of the public 
trust doctrine is a matter of state law so the Court’s reasoning in Illinois Central Railroad is not 
necessarily binding upon the states.  Id.  Despite these criticisms and limits to Illinois Central 
Railroad, the Court’s language and reasoning remain a powerfully illustrative exposition on the 
importance of public control over public trust resources which state courts routinely rely upon.  
See, e.g., Owsichek v. Guide Licensing and Control Bd., 763 P.2d 488, 496 (Alaska 1988) (calling 
Illinois Central Railroad “the lodestar of American public trust law”); City of Berkeley v. 
Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362, 365 (Cal. 1980) (stating that Illinois Central Railroad “remains the 
primary [public trust doctrine] authority even today, almost nine decades after is was decided”). 
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interested, like navigable waters and soils under them, so as to 
leave them entirely under the use and control of private parties . . . 
than it can abdicate its police powers in the administration of the 
government and the preservation of the peace. . . .  So with trusts 
connected with public property, or property of a special character, 
like lands under navigable waters, they cannot be placed entirely 
beyond the direction and control of the State.74 
The Court’s language and reasoning in Illinois Central Railroad 
illustrates the importance of public control over public resources.  
This reasoning, which prohibits a state from fully divesting itself of 
public trust lands, would still be applicable in the climate change 
context and would likely require a state to fully assert the public trust 
over any newly created public trust lands and waters.  It should be as 
impermissible for a state to allow private individuals to retain control 
over the use of recently created tidal lands and waters as it is for a 
state to divest itself of control over existing tidal lands and waters.  
Each state will have full discretion in choosing how to assert public 
control over the recently created public trust lands and waters.75  
Some states may decide to take title to submerged private lands; 
while others might merely subject the private land to the public trust. 
B. Climate Change—Beyond the Scope of the Doctrine of Erosion 
and Accretion 
The common law doctrine of erosion and accretion recognizes 
that coasts are naturally dynamic ecosystems with property 
boundaries that shift over time.76  Given the transitory nature of 
coastal property boundaries, the courts have reasoned that a rigid 
application of the takings clause is unworkable, and have consistently 
ruled that a taking does not occur when a private property owner 
loses land to the state due to erosion.77 
Large-scale sea level rise due to climate change should be 
considered beyond the scope of the common law doctrine of erosion 
and accretion.  First, this sea level rise will be unprecedented in 
American history, and the common law erosion and accretion 
doctrine was not developed for such a large loss of coastal land to the 
sea.  In addition, there is a fundamental difference in the localized 
 74. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 453-54. 
 75. See, e.g., Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894) (stating that each State may utilize 
“the tide waters within its borders according to its own views of justice and policy”). 
 76. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text. 
 77. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text. 
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physical forces that cause erosion and the global rise in sea level 
caused by climate change.  Second, one justification for the erosion 
and accretion doctrine is that there is a rough proportionality and 
symmetry to the doctrine, so that a coastal property owner may either 
gain or lose land by its application.78  If sea level rise causes the 
doctrine to consistently work to the detriment of private property 
owners then there is no longer any implicit fairness or symmetry to 
the doctrine.  Third, the erosion and accretion doctrine typically only 
applies to natural changes in the tide line.79  The question of whether 
sea level rise that is caused by climate change is “natural” is not easily 
answered.80  Should anthropogenic changes to the Earth’s climate be 
considered “natural”?  Fourth, large-scale sea level rise may 
submerge properties far inland of the current coastline and it seems 
inequitable to apply the erosion and accretion doctrine to property 
owners whose property did not initially abut the public trust lands 
and waters.  If the erosion and accretion doctrine is premised upon 
the reasonable expectations of coastal property owners regarding the 
natural movement of the tide line81 and a rough sense of equity in that 
these owners stand to either gain or lose land through the operation 
of the doctrine,82 then it is questionable whether the doctrine should 
apply to property owners who took title to land not initially abutting 
the ocean. 
C. A Unique and Novel Challenge to Current Takings Jurisprudence 
If a state takes title or asserts control over private lands and the 
common law doctrine of erosion and accretion does not apply, then 
the concise language of the takings clause—“private property [shall 
not] be taken for public use, without just compensation”83—clearly 
 78. See KALO ET AL., supra note 43, at 51 (stating that one justification for the general rule 
that littoral owners take title to accretions is that “if the waterfront owner is to lose land to 
erosion, then it seems only fair to allow her to benefit from the reverse process of accretion”). 
 79. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text. 
 80. For example, among the definitions of “natural” are “existing in or caused by nature; 
not artificial . . . in the course of nature; not exceptional or miraculous.”  THE OXFORD 
AMERICAN DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS 992 (American ed. 2003).  The effects of climate 
change could reasonably be considered to be “existing in nature,” but it seems problematic to 
state that these effects are “in the course of nature” and are not “exceptional.” 
 81. Only natural changes to the shoreline are within the scope of the erosion and accretion 
doctrine; avulsion and sudden changes to the shoreline are excluded and will not result in a 
change to the prevailing public/private ownership of coastal lands.  See supra notes 58-60 and 
accompanying text. 
 82. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 83. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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seems to require compensation to the private landowners.  The 
Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he clearest sort of taking occurs 
when the government encroaches upon or occupies private land for 
its own proposed use.”84  The power to exclude others has been 
described as “one of the most treasured strands in an owner’s bundle 
of property rights,”85 and an occupation of private property destroys 
this important property right.  Even if a state did not take title to 
submerged private lands, but instead subjected it to the public trust, it 
would still be considered the “functional equivalent” of a government 
occupation because the private property owner would lose the right 
to exclude the public from the property.86 
However, despite the seemingly unambiguous language of the 
takings clause the judiciary’s inquiry into abstract questions such as,  
what is “property”, when is it “taken”, has led to a complex doctrine 
in which the Court has attempted to balance private property 
interests against the government’s ability to modify property law in 
light of technological and social change.87  Climate change, and the 
resultant unprecedented rise in sea level, presents a unique challenge 
to our current takings jurisprudence. 
V.  A REEXAMINATION OF THE  
TAKINGS CLAUSE IN A CLIMATE CHANGED FUTURE 
It should not be considered a taking under the Fifth Amendment 
when the public trust doctrine compels a state to take title or assert 
control on behalf of the public over private lands that have been 
permanently submerged by the rise in sea level caused by climate 
change.  Despite extensive and unambiguous precedent that the 
government’s physical occupation or appropriation of private 
 84. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001) (emphasis added). 
 85. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982). 
 86. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (noting that the Court’s 
regulatory takings jurisprudence “aims to identify regulatory actions that are functionally 
equivalent to the classic taking in which government directly appropriates private property or 
ousts the owner from his domain”).  See also Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: 
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of ‘Just Compensation’ Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 
1184 (1967) (“The one incontestable case for compensation (short of physical expropriation) 
seems to occur when the government deliberately brings it about that . . . the public at large, 
‘regularly’ use, or ‘permanently’ occupy, space or a thing which theretofore was understood to 
be under private ownership.”). 
 87. See, e.g., Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449, 1454 (1990) 
(discussing the “normative pulls and counterpulls that have shaped our takings jurisprudence”). 
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property is the “paradigmatic,”88 “classic,”89 and “clearest sort”90 of 
taking, the remainder of this Note presents arguments and 
justifications for a deviation from this per se possessory takings rule.  
In short, climate change and the resulting sea level rise present 
exceptional circumstances that warrant a narrow exception to the 
general possessory takings rule.  It must be stressed that this 
exception is quite narrow, as it would only be applicable in the 
context of private lands submerged by the ocean due to climate 
change.  This exception to the takings clause will allow property law 
to adapt to a climate changed future, while still providing the 
protections that private property owners enjoy today. 
A. An Unprecedented Event in American History 
The drafters of the Fifth Amendment did not intend to protect 
private property owners from climate change and its effects.  When 
the Fifth Amendment was ratified in 1791, the physics of greenhouse 
gas emissions and climate change were unknown and the idea that 
human activity was altering the Earth’s climate was still over one 
hundred years away.91  It would likely have been inconceivable to the 
drafters of the takings clause that thousands of square miles of 
American land and private property would become submerged by the 
ocean because human activity altered the Earth’s climate and caused 
sea level to rise to then unfathomable levels. 
However, because climate change and large-scale sea level rise 
were not threats to private property interests when the Fifth 
Amendment was ratified, it should not necessarily follow that the 
takings clause does not provide protection against a governmental 
taking whose cause was unanticipated.  Instead, the protections 
provided by the takings clause, as with other provisions in the Bill of 
Rights, should be carefully reexamined when technological or societal 
change recasts the nature of the right, freedom, or liberty that is 
protected. 92  Despite extensive Supreme Court precedent clearly 
 88. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537. 
 89. Id. at 539. 
 90. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at  617. 
 91. In 1859, the British physicist John Tyndall identified the greenhouse effect of heat 
trapping gases such as carbon dioxide and methane.  Elizabeth Kolbert, The Climate of Man – I, 
THE NEW YORKER, Apr. 25, 2005, at 7-8. In 1895, the Swedish chemist Svante Arrhenius 
presented his theory that humans could alter the Earth’s climate by emitting greenhouse gases 
to the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences.  Id. at 8. 
 92. For example, with technological advancements such as automatic, nuclear, and 
biological weapons it becomes necessary to determine what “Arms” are protected by the 
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holding that it is a taking when the government physically invades or 
appropriates private property,93 the effects and challenges of climate 
change and large-scale sea level rise will require a reexamination of 
the takings clause.  Some may find this reexamination to be 
reactionary and extreme because of the long-standing per se 
possessory takings rule. 94  However, the rule’s stability and longevity 
illustrate the truly unique threat that climate change and large-scale 
sea level rise pose to private property owners and American property 
law. Reexamining what protections are provided by the takings clause 
is not itself an unprecedented undertaking.  When the Fifth 
Amendment was ratified the takings clause was understood to 
provide protection against possessory takings, but not against a 
diminution of property resulting from government regulation.95  Thus, 
the creation of regulatory takings in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon 
can be viewed as a reexamination and evolution of the takings clause 
Second Amendment.  In 1939, the Supreme Court held that only weapons that have a 
“reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia” are 
protected by the Second Amendment.  United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939); see also 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2814, 2816 (2008) (noting that “[l]ike most rights, 
the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited[,]” and affirming Miller’s holding 
that “the Second Amendment right, whatever its nature, extends only to certain types of 
weapons”).  The advent of the Internet and the challenges it poses to First Amendment 
jurisprudence provide a contemporary example of the inherent struggle as protections in the 
Bill of Rights must evolve in light of technological change.  See, e.g., Dawn C. Nunziato, The 
Death of the Public Forum in Cyberspace, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1115, 1118 (2005) (noting 
that private entities not subject to the First Amendment typically control speech on the 
Internet, which has led to a lack of a requisite public forum; and that “Congress and the courts 
have declined to take the steps necessary to update First Amendment jurisprudence”); Todd G. 
Hartman, The Marketplace vs. the Ideas: The First Amendment Challenges to Internet 
Commerce, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 419, 425 (1999) (noting that “federal policy regarding the 
development of the Internet has been criticized for its ‘complete absence of the First 
Amendment’” and arguing that a successful e-commerce policy must be “guided by the 
internet’s First Amendment parameters”). 
 93. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text. 
 94. Despite ideological efforts to frame property rights as inviolate and sacrosanct, even 
Justice Holmes—the revered creator of regulatory takings—stated of property rights: “[All 
rights] in fact are limited by the neighborhood of principles of policy which are other than those 
on which the particular right is founded, and which become strong enough to hold their own 
when a certain point is reached.”  Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 
(1908). 
 95. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1114 (1992) (“Prior to Justice 
Holmes’s exposition in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon . . . it was generally thought that the 
Takings Clause reached only a ‘direct appropriation’ of property . . . .”); see also John F. Hart, 
Land Use Law in the Early Republic and the Original Meaning of the Takings Clause, 94 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1099, 1133 (2000) (arguing that the Framers intended the takings clause to be a 
confirmation of the status quo, where diminution of property caused by government regulation 
was not compensated unless physical appropriation of property occurred). 
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that was necessitated by increasingly burdensome government 
regulations.96  An additional reexamination of the takings clause will 
be necessary as a result of climate change and large-scale sea level 
rise. 
B. Distinct From the Typical Possessory Taking 
The Supreme Court has stated that “[w]hile scholars have 
offered various justifications for [the takings clause], we have 
emphasized its role in ‘barring Government from forcing some people 
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should 
be borne by the public as a whole.’”97  Thus, one primary purpose of 
the takings clause is to prevent the government from actively singling 
out individual private property owners and forcing them to forfeit 
their property for the public good without just compensation.  The 
government taking that will arise from climate change and large-scale 
sea level rise is unique and can be distinguished from the usual 
possessory taking, where the government singles out individuals and 
forces them to cede property rights to the government.  First, with 
climate change induced sea level rise the government action is 
passive, in that the government is not actively forcing or causing the 
loss of private property.  The loss of private property rights to the 
government is merely a response to the complex and uncontrollable 
effects of global climate change.  Second, the government is not 
singling out individuals.  The government will have little or no control 
over which lands become submerged, and all coastal property owners 
will share in the risks and losses posed by large-scale sea level rise. 
1. Passive v. Active Takings 
The nature of the government action that results in a potential 
taking here is passive, as states will only take title or assert the public 
trust over submerged land in response to a large-scale rise in sea level 
that is beyond the state’s control.  This passive nature of the 
government action stands in contrast to the usual possessory taking, 
 96. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).  In Pennsylvania Coal, the Court expressed concern that “[w]hen 
this seemingly absolute protection [of the Fifth Amendment] is found to be qualified by the 
police power, the natural tendency of human nature is to extend the qualification more and 
more until at last private property disappears.”  Id. at 415.  The Court then warned that “[w]e 
are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not 
enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for 
the change,” id. at 416, and that as a result government regulation that went “too far” in 
diminishing the value of property would be “recognized as a taking,” id. at 415. 
 97. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) (emphasis added). 
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which involves a government decision to take private property that is 
wholly subject to the government’s discretion.  Common examples of 
the typical active possessory takings include government decisions to 
condemn specific land in order to build a road, expand an airport, or 
construct a military facility.  In such cases the government action 
clearly causes of the loss of private property, and whose property is 
taken is subject to the government’s discretion.  Conversely, with the 
passive taking resulting from large-scale sea level rise the government 
action is not the direct cause of the loss of private property, and the 
government will exercise no discretion regarding whether to subject a 
given property to the public trust. 
This distinction between passive and active takings is consistent 
with a seemingly similar line of cases finding a taking under the Fifth 
Amendment when private property is flooded as the result of a dam 
built or permitted by the government.98  When the government builds 
or permits a dam that floods private lands it is actively causing the 
loss of private property.  In contrast, with climate change the private 
lands will be submerged regardless of the government’s action or 
inaction. 
The proposition that climate change induced large-scale sea level 
rise will result in a passive government taking that is distinct from the 
typical active possessory taking raises two issues regarding causation.  
First, is it proper to construe the government taking as a passive 
reaction to the uncontrollable effects of global climate change?  
Government activities emit substantial quantities of greenhouse gases 
which contribute to climate change.99  In addition, it could be argued 
that the government’s failure to effectively regulate greenhouse gas 
emissions is also a cause of climate change.100  If the government has 
partially caused the climate change that leads to large-scale sea level 
rise then perhaps this is not properly characterized as a passive 
 98. See, e.g., United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799, 809 (1950) (“[T]he 
destruction of privately owned land by flooding is ‘a taking’ to the extent of the destruction 
caused.”); United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 470 (1903) (“[W]here the government by the 
construction of a dam or other public works so floods lands belonging to an individual as to 
substantially destroy their value there is a taking within the scope of the Fifth Amendment.”). 
 99. See Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1457-58 (2007) (noting that 
motor vehicle emissions substantially contribute to global warming, the United States 
government uses a large number of motor vehicles every year). 
 100. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the petitioners argued that the EPA’s failure to regulate 
carbon dioxide emissions from automobiles was one cause of climate change.  Id. at 1457-58 
(2007) (“Judged by any standard, U.S. motor-vehicle emissions make a meaningful contribution 
to greenhouse gas concentrations and hence, according to petitioners, to global warming.”). 
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taking, but is instead a form of the typical, active, possessory taking.  
One problem with this line of argument is that state governments, not 
the federal government, will assert the public trust over submerged 
lands.101  As the Supreme Court noted in Massachusetts v. EPA, 
federalism principles, and Clean Air Act preemption specifically, 
prevent the states from enacting some forms of stringent greenhouse 
gas emission regulations in an attempt to mitigate climate change and 
sea level rise.102  In addition, even if we were to assume that a state 
has partially caused climate change, that state would continue to lose 
coastal land to sea level rise even if it were to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions to zero, so long as other states or other nations continue to 
emit greenhouse gases.103  Thus, a state should not be considered to 
have actively caused the large-scale sea level rise that results in a loss 
of private property because the extent of any state’s causation is 
minimal, states are preempted from taking some measures to 
aggressively reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and there will be 
continued rise in sea level even if a state were to eliminate all 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
A second issue is whether it should be considered a passive 
taking if a state regulates or prohibits coastal property owners from 
defending their land from the rising sea level.  For example, in North 
Carolina a permit is required to erect a bulkhead in certain estuarine 
waters,104 and bulkheads are prohibited in ocean hazard areas.105  In 
addition, there have been proposals to further limit the use of 
bulkheads and other erosion control devices within the state because 
 101. One interesting possibility beyond the scope of this Note might be raised if a state did 
not take title or assert the public trust over submerged private lands.  Could a private property 
owner whose land was submerged then bring a claim of inverse condemnation, alleging that the 
government’s actions or failure to effectively regulate greenhouse gas emissions took their 
property?  Cf. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (holding that it was a taking by 
inverse condemnation when the noise of low-flying military aircraft interfered with the private 
property they flew directly over). 
 102. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1454 (noting that “[w]hen a State enters the Union, 
it surrenders certain sovereign prerogatives.  Massachusetts cannot invade Rhode Island to 
force reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, it cannot negotiate an emissions treaty with China 
or India, and in some circumstances the exercise of its police powers to reduce in-state motor-
vehicle emissions might well be pre-empted”). 
 103. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court noted that while predicted greenhouse gas emission 
increases from China and India would likely offset any domestic reduction in greenhouse gas 
emissions that the petitioners sought, a minimal reduction in greenhouse gas emissions is still a 
reduction.  The Court then rejected the EPA’s argument that this created a lack of 
redressability and hence a lack of standing.  Id. at 1457-58. 
 104. 15A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 7H.1101 (2007). 
 105. 15A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 7H.0308 (2007). 
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of their adverse ecological impacts.106  State prohibition or regulation 
of erosion control devices that could protect land from the rising sea 
level raises legitimate questions of whether a state has actively caused 
the loss of private land.107  However, the extent of the large-scale sea 
level rise that is projected is so great that it will likely submerge many 
coastal lands despite the use of erosion control devices.  Thus the 
regulation of bulkheads and erosion control devices should not be 
considered the cause of the loss of most coastal private property 
inundated by climate change.  Assuming that the regulation or 
prohibition of erosion control devices is intended to protect coastal 
ecology, and not to thwart private landowners’ efforts to retain their 
land, the taking could still be considered a passive reaction to effects 
of climate change that are beyond the state’s control. 
2. No Singling Out 
The Supreme Court has stated that one purpose of the takings 
clause is to prevent the government from singling out individuals and 
forcing them to bear public burdens.108  This protection against 
singling out individuals is well-justified in the usual possessory takings 
context, such as when the government must decide which of two 
neighboring tracts of land to condemn for public development.  
However, this protection against discrimination is less compelling in 
the context of climate change and sea level rise.  The chemistry and 
physics of greenhouse gas emissions, climate change, and sea level 
rise will ultimately determine what land will become submerged by 
the ocean.  The government action taking these lands is merely a 
response to these physical forces of nature, and the states will not 
 106. See, e.g., BONNIE M. BENDELL ET AL., RECOMMENDATIONS FOR APPROPRIATE 
SHORELINE STABILIZATION METHODS FOR THE DIFFERENT NORTH CAROLINA ESTUARINE 
SHORELINE TYPES 1-1 (2006) (“The current [estuarine erosion] management strategies need 
stronger consideration of the estuarine habitats, impact of the erosion control structures and 
migration of wetlands in response to rising sea level . . . .  [I]t is becoming apparent that some 
stabilization methods are not necessarily appropriate for all shoreline types and the shore zone 
as a whole.”), available at http://dcm2.enr.state.nc.us/Hazards/EWG%20Final%20Report 
%20082106.pdf. 
 107. Courts have held that a state may prohibit activities adverse to the public trust, such as 
erecting bulkheads, without committing a taking.  See McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 580 
S.E.2d 116, 120 (S.C. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 982 (2003) (stating that the “reversion to 
tidelands effected a restriction on [plaintiff’s] property rights inherent in the ownership of a 
property bordering tidal water” and that the plaintiff’s “ownership rights do not include the 
right to backfill or place bulkheads on public trust land and the State need not compensate 
him . . . .”). 
 108. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.  See also Rose, supra note 37, at 261 (stating 
that “political ‘singling out’” is the “usual gravamen of takings claims”). 
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decide which individual private property owner’s lands will become 
subject to the public trust.  All coastal property owners face the risks 
from climate change and will lose property to the state if their land 
becomes inundated by a rise in sea level. 
This distinction between an active government taking and a 
passive taking is similar to the constitutional due process distinction 
between adjudication and legislation.  The Supreme Court has held 
that the Fourteenth Amendment requires greater procedural due 
process protections when the government has the power to single out 
individuals. 109  This reasoning is similar in the takings context here.  If 
one purpose of the takings clause is to protect individual private 
property owners from being singled out by the government to bear 
public burdens, then the protection is unnecessary when the 
government does not single out individuals for a taking. 
C. Reasonable Expectations 
One central tenet of the Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence 
is that the Fifth Amendment protects private property owners’ 
reasonable expectations regarding what constitutes “property.”110  
This protection of reasonable expectations has played a prominent 
role in many of the Court’s landmark opinions on regulatory takings.  
For example, in Penn Central the Court stated that one factor to be 
considered in determining whether a government regulation was a 
taking was its interference with “distinct investment-backed 
expectations.”111  In addition, the “background principles of nuisance 
and property law” that form an exception to the Court’s categorical 
takings rule in Lucas are premised upon the reasonable expectations 
of private property owners.112  Yet, it is important to appreciate that 
reasonable expectations are not static.  As the Lucas Court noted, 
 109. Compare Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) (holding that the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires procedural due process for adjudications) with Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. 
State Bd. of Equalization of Colo., 239 U.S. 441 (1915) (holding that no procedural due process 
is required by the Fourteenth Amendment for legislation and rulemaking, in part because no 
individuals are singled out).  See also RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
AND PROCESS 251-52 (3d ed. 1999) (stating that when the government action affects a large 
number of people “there is much less need for due process protection than when the 
government singles out an individual for particularly disadvantageous treatment”). 
 110. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 87, at 1524 (“The Court has frequently suggested that 
the immediate goal of the takings protections is to protect settled expectations of property 
holders.”). 
 111. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
 112. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992). 
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what is considered a reasonable expectation of private property 
owners may change and evolve over time.113 
Determining the reasonable expectations of a private property 
owner whose land is inundated by a rise in sea level that is caused by 
climate change should be a major factor in the takings analysis.  On 
one hand, the threat of large-scale sea level rise that submerges 
substantial amounts of private land does not seem to be a reasonable 
expectation of most coastal property owners today.  After all, a rise in 
sea level that is unprecedented in American history would seem by its 
very nature to be beyond the scope of reasonable expectations.  It is 
quite doubtful that an individual purchasing real estate in Miami 
today would reasonably expect that the property could be under the 
ocean waters by the end of this century.  Similarly, while the common 
law erosion and accretion doctrine may impute reasonable 
expectations regarding transitory property boundaries to littoral 
owners on the coastline, it seems problematic and inequitable to 
apply the doctrine to a property owner whose land is currently not 
abutting the ocean.114  If an individual took title to property when it 
was a substantial distance from the ocean, did they acquire the 
property with the reasonable expectation that they may later lose the 
property to the state via the public trust doctrine?  If losing property 
to the government because of climate change and rising sea level is 
not considered to be within the reasonable expectations of private 
property owners, it would lend support for finding a taking that 
requires just compensation. 
However, there is still a strong argument that large-scale sea 
level rise will be within the reasonable expectations of private 
property owners.  In Lucas, the Court acknowledged that property 
owners’ reasonable expectations are not static, but can evolve over 
time.115  If that is so, then a large-scale rise in sea level could be a 
paradigmatic example of a change in reasonable expectations because 
this rise in sea level will occur over a relatively long time-frame.116  
 113. Id. at 1031 (noting that “changed circumstances or new knowledge may make what was 
previously permissible no longer so”); id. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The State should 
not be prevented from enacting new regulatory initiatives in response to changing conditions, 
and courts must consider all reasonable expectations whatever their source.  The Takings 
Clause does not require a static body of state property law, it protects private expectations to 
ensure private investment.”). 
 114. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text. 
 115. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031, 1035. 
 116. For example, the IPCC projects a 0.6 meter (1.97 feet) rise in global sea level by 2100.  
See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
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Property owners anywhere near the ocean should be considered to 
have constructive notice that their property may be threatened by sea 
level rise.  The potential effects of climate change have been well 
documented in the national media.117  On November 5, 2007, NBC’s 
Today Show even broadcast live from on top of the Greenland Ice 
Sheet and documented its unexpectedly rapid rate of melting.118  It 
would be reasonable to consider coastal property owners’ 
expectations to have evolved to incorporate this threat considering 
that it will be years until sea level rise results in the loss of substantial 
amounts of land.  Because of the slow and continuous nature of sea 
level rise, coastal property owners will have adequate time to adjust 
their expectations as their property slowly disappears under the 
waters—inch by inch, year after year.  No property owner will face 
the sudden surprise that their land has unexpectedly become 
submerged by the ocean and is now subject to the public trust.  If 
large-scale sea level rise is considered to be a reasonable expectation 
of all property owners near the ocean, then when the state takes title 
to these lands after they are submerged it supports a finding that no 
taking occurred, as no reasonable property expectations were upset. 
D. Inefficiencies and Administrative Difficulties in Providing Just 
Compensation 
Providing an efficient system of compensation will be 
exceedingly difficult if it is considered a taking when a state takes title 
or asserts the public trust over submerged private lands.  A host of 
factors will complicate structuring an efficient system: the amount of 
compensation that must be paid to private landowners will likely be 
relatively low, the landowners affected will be great in number and 
geographically dispersed, and the private lands will be taken at a slow 
and continuous pace.  First, the amount of just compensation due to a 
private property owner would likely be relatively low if the state 
action affecting said property is considered a taking.  This is despite 
the fact that today there is immense wealth in the coastal areas that 
 117. As just one example of the national media coverage of climate change, Time Magazine 
has recently devoted extensive cover stories to the threats posed by climate change.  Jeffrey 
Kluger, What Now?, TIME, Apr. 9, 2007, at 50; Jeffrey Kluger, Global Warming Heats Up, TIME, 
Apr. 3, 2006, at 35. 
 118. See Richard Huff, ‘Today’ Show Will Go to North Pole & South Pole,  N.Y. DAILY 
NEWS, Oct. 17, 2007, available at http://www.nydailynews.com/entertainment/tv/2007/10/17/2007-
10-17_today_show_will_go_to_north_pole__south_.html (noting that Matt Lauer would 
broadcast from the Greenland Ice Sheet in programming “designed to enlighten viewers about 
the state of the Earth”). 
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are threatened by climate change. 119  The general rule is that the 
compensation that must be paid to a private property owner is the fair 
market value of the taken property.120  Just as the long-term, slow rate 
of sea level rise will allow coastal property owners’ reasonable 
expectations to adjust to the climate changed future,121 this slow and 
predictable pace of sea level rise will be reflected in the fair market 
value of coastal properties.  The fair market value of threatened 
properties should drop significantly as the forecasts and projections 
for what lands will be inundated by sea level rise become more 
accurate and localized, and as the waters continue to slowly rise year 
after year.  There will likely be a significant drop in demand for land 
that will soon be under the ocean.  The fair market value of this land 
will likely drop in value even further when it actually becomes 
inundated by the ocean.122  It is at this point, when the private land 
becomes submerged by the ocean and the value of the land is likely to 
be at its lowest, that the state government will assert the public trust 
over the land.  As a result, if it is considered a taking, then the just 
compensation owed to the private property owner will likely be 
substantially lower that the value of the property today. 
If state actions are considered takings, the compensation owed to 
each landholder will usually not amount to much, but the slow and 
continuous nature of sea level rise creates problems for structuring a 
system of compensation.  First, the private land will become 
submerged and subject to the public trust at a continuous, but 
extremely slow rate and this creates problems for determining the 
proper frequency of compensation.  The rise in sea level will be 
imperceptible on a daily basis, and will likely be relatively 
insubstantial even on an annual basis.123  How often then should the 
government have to provide payment to the private property owners 
for the land it has taken?  An annual payment might seem logical.  
 119. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 120. United States v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U.S. 341, 344 (1923) (“Where private 
property is taken for public use, and there is a market price prevailing at the time and place of 
the taking, that price is just compensation.”). 
 121. See supra notes 110-18 and accompanying text. 
    122.   As Ted Turner once succinctly stated on climate change: “People like to live close to the 
ocean, but they don’t want to live under it.” Betsy Marston, Heard Around the West, HIGH 
COUNTRY NEWS, May 26, 2008, at 32.   
 123. Since 1993 the seas have risen by 3 mm per year.  See supra note 23 and accompanying 
text.  To provide a rough idea and crude approximation of future sea level rise we could assume 
a linear rate of rise.  Under that assumption, the IPCC’s projection of a 0.6 meter rise in sea 
level by 2100 would cause a 6.5 mm annual rise in sea level.  If sea level rose by one meter by 
2100, the linear annual rise in sea level would be 1.1 cm per year. 
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However, given the relatively small quantities of land taken on an 
annual basis from individual private property owners and the low fair 
market value of these properties, such an annual payment would 
likely be negligible and the process would have to be repeated 
continuously year after year until the entire property was taken.  
Perhaps it would be more efficient to wait until a substantial portion 
of the private property has been taken until compensation must be 
paid?  However, such a system raises fairness concerns because of the 
inherent arbitrariness of identifying a critical threshold when 
compensation would be payable. In addition, private landowners 
would be forced to suffer an uncompensated taking for a period of 
time, and additional compensation would still have to be paid in the 
future for the remainder of the property that is later taken.  Perhaps 
then no compensation should be required until a given property is 
entirely submerged?  This would lead to greater efficiency, but would 
require a private property owner to suffer an uncompensated taking 
for a substantial period of time.  Courts might construe any taking 
that went uncompensated for a significant duration of time to be a 
taking without just compensation, rendering such a system 
unconstitutional. 
Another difficulty in structuring a compensation system would 
be deciding whether the government would be responsible for 
initiating payment, or whether private parties would be left to seek 
compensation from the government in the courts.  Either way there 
will be substantial costs incurred to provide compensation to private 
landowners.  If the government provides a compensation program 
then it would likely require a survey and appraisal of the submerged 
private lands along a state’s entire coastline.  Depending upon the 
frequency with which compensation must be paid, the costs of such a 
program could conceivably dwarf the amount of compensation paid 
to private property owners.  If private individuals are left to bring suit 
against the government for compensation then there would also be 
high litigation and transaction costs that could exceed the 
compensation received.  For private landowners with small holdings 
these costs could be prohibitive. 
Thus, if it is considered a taking when the government takes title 
or asserts the public trust over lands submerged by climate change 
and large-scale sea level rise it will likely be difficult to provide 
compensation in an efficient manner.  This is due to several factors 
which include the likely low fair market value of private lands that 
have been inundated by the ocean, the large number of private 
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property owners that will lose land to the government, and the slow 
and continual nature of sea level rise.  These difficulties in providing 
efficient compensation are an additional factor which distinguishes 
the potential government taking here from the usual possessory 
taking. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Climate change and large-scale sea level rise will present unique 
challenges to American property law.  The public trust doctrine will 
compel the states to assert the public trust over submerged private 
lands that have become tidal lands and waters.  The loss of this 
private land is beyond the scope of the common law doctrine of 
erosion and accretion, so the takings clause would seemingly require 
the states to compensate the private property owners for a possessory 
taking.  Yet finding a taking here is problematic because of the 
magnitude of the potential sea level rise—thousands of square miles 
of land and several major cities are at risk of being submerged. 
This unprecedented threat posed by climate change calls for a 
narrow exception to the current per se possessory takings rule that it 
always constitutes a taking when the government physically occupies 
or appropriates private property.  The taking that results from climate 
change and large-scale sea level rise is distinguished from the typical 
possessory taking because it is a passive government reaction to an 
uncontrollable force of nature that is novel and unprecedented.  In 
addition, the government will not single out individual private 
property owners for the taking, and the government action will not 
upset the reasonable expectations of private landowners because of 
the slow rate of sea level rise.  Finally, providing a system of 
compensation would likely be inefficient and impracticable.  Thus, it 
should not be considered a taking when a state asserts the public trust 
over private lands submerged because of climate change and large-
scale sea level rise. 
